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Institutional democratization has made considerable progress in the history of the
European Union (EU). Mainstream theories of democratization, however, fail to capture
this process because they are wedded to the nation-state context. This paper therefore
proposes a transformationalist theory of democratization beyond the state. EU
democratization results from the conflict about the redistribution of political competences
between institutional actors in a multilevel system, in which liberal democracy is the
shared norm of legitimate authority. To the extent that institutional actors, who push
for further integration in order to increase efficiency, undermine existing democratic
institutions at the national level, their competitors can put into question the legitimacy
of integration by invoking the shared liberal democratic community norms and shame
them into making democratic concessions. The normative origins of democracy in the EU
are illustrated in case studies on democratic membership conditionality, legislative rights
of the European Parliament, and the institutionalization of human rights in the EU.
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Introduction
The considerable expansion of the scope and level of European integration since
the end of the 1980s has given rise to a burgeoning literature on its consequences
for democracy.1 Almost all of this literature is normative, evaluative, and pre-
scriptive: it discusses the appropriate standards for democracy in the European
Union (EU), assesses the state of democracy in the EU against these standards, and
makes suggestions for improvement. This paper takes a different perspective.
It starts from the substantial institutional democratization that the EU has
undergone in its history with regard to membership, the power of parliament, and
human rights. Rather than evaluating these changes against a normative yard-
stick, it asks why and how democratization has occurred. Standard theories of
democratization, however, fail to provide convincing explanations because they
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are too strongly wedded to the nation-state to capture the specific dynamics in the
European multilevel system. In particular, the demand-side conditions prevalent
in analyses of nation-state democratization are conspicuously absent in the EU: a
culturally integrated and politically structured demos, redistributive conflict
between elites and citizens, and social unrest creating revolutionary threats.
This paper therefore proposes a ‘transformationalist’ theory of democratization
in the European multilevel system. Transformationalist theories dispute the gra-
dualist claim that democracy and democratization in the international domain are
simply the extension of nation-state democracy and democratization on a larger
scale.2 They regard both as qualitatively different and the difference as a result
of a new ‘transformation of democracy’ (Dahl, 1989, 1994). Whereas theories of
democratization generally assume the pre-existence of a single demos, the EU
consists of multiple political communities. Moreover, the EU lacks the centralized
powers of coercion, taxation, and redistribution that democratic movements have
traditionally mobilized against and sought to bring under popular control. On the
other hand, however, the EU’s multinational and multilevel system is embedded in
a community of values in which liberal democracy is the accepted standard of
legitimate political authority.
I argue that democratization in this context is the outcome of constitutional
conflict between institutional actors in the EU multilevel system. The powerful
actors in this system push for further integration in order to increase efficiency
without paying much attention to democratic legitimacy. Weak actors, however,
can put into question the legitimacy of integration and put normative pressure
on the powerful actors if they undermine generally accepted liberal democratic
institutional norms. At important critical junctures in the history of European
integration, powerful institutional actors have adopted liberal democratic norms
at the European level in order to preserve the legitimacy of the integration process
and of their position in the multilevel system. It is for that reason that I speak
of the normative origins of democracy in the EU and distinguish it from the
economic or social origins of democracy highlighted in studies of the nation-state
(Moore, 1966; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly describe important
developments in the institutional democratization of the EU. In search of an
explanation, I then turn to theories of nation-state democratization. In response to
their limits, I develop my own argument about the normative origins of democ-
racy in the EU. To substantiate the argument empirically, I present three brief case
studies on the introduction of the democratic membership norm, legislative
competences for the European Parliament (EP), and human rights into European
law. The main focus of the paper, however, is on conceptualization and theory
development rather than empirical analysis.
2 On gradualism and transformationalism in democratic theory, see e.g. Held et al. (1999: 7–9) and
Bohman (2007: 20–30).
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Democratization in the EU
I will first give a brief overview of the community’s 50-year trajectory from an
international organization with very limited traits of democracy to one that has
the major institutional trappings of a democratic polity. The analysis will be based
on a formal and rather minimalist definition of democracy. For one, I base my
claim on the formal rights and competencies codified in EU treaty law. Moreover,
I will limit myself to three constitutive institutions of liberal democracy. First, the
representative assembly, which aggregates the preferences of the citizens, passes
laws, and monitors the executive; second, the human rights regime that serves to
protect the fundamental negative and positive freedoms of the citizens; and third,
the membership regime that determines who is entitled to join the polity and enjoy
the rights it confers on its members. The overview will focus on the initial state of
democracy according to the Treaties of Rome (signed in 1957) and the current
state of democracy according to the Treaty of Lisbon (signed in 2007).
Democratic membership
For democracy in a multilevel polity such as the EU, it is essential that all member
states are democratic. Article 237 of the Treaty establishing a European Economic
Community simply stated that ‘any European state may apply to become a
member of the Community’ and left it to the member state governments to decide
unanimously on the application. No further criteria were explicitly attached. The
new Article 49 as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon reads: ‘Any European State
which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting
them may apply to become a member of the Union’. These values are ‘respect for
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’. That is, the
Union is now explicitly constituted as a union of democratic European states.
Powers of the parliament
Under the Treaties of Rome, the Assembly was composed of delegates from
national parliaments. Whereas it had no business in the appointment of the
Commission, it had the right to adopt a motion of censure causing the entire
Commission to resign. With regard to the budget and to legislation, the Assembly
only had a consultative role, that is, no formal power over the final decision.
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the co-decision procedure is the ‘ordinary
legislative procedure’ applied to the vast bulk of the EU’s legislation. Under this
procedure, the EP is put on an equal footing with the Council in deciding legis-
lation. Budgetary decision-making is now similar to co-decision insofar as it
requires the consent of the EP and envisages a conciliation process in case
the Council and the EP do not reach agreement. Finally, the role of the EP in the
appointment of the Commission has been strengthened over time. Whereas the
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European Council still proposes the candidate for Commission President, it does
so ‘taking into account the elections to the EP’, which means that the party
affiliation of the President is likely to mirror that of the majority (coalition) in
Parliament. The appointment of the Commission President as well as that of the
entire Commission is subject to the EP’s consent. In the new Article 10, the Treaty
now stipulates that ‘the functioning of the Union shall be founded on repre-
sentative democracy’. It creates a roughly balanced bicameral legislature, in which
one chamber – the EP – represents the individual citizens, and the other – the
Council – the member states. Because member states are democracies, both
chambers of the Union legislature are democratically legitimated.
Human rights
The treaties of Rome did not contain any general human rights provisions, nor
did they accord the supranational organs of the Community any competences in
this area. According to the new treaty, however, the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of 2000, which includes a broad set of rights but had only been politically
binding before, possesses ‘the same legal value as the Treaties’ (Article 6.1).
In addition, the EU commits itself to acceding to the European Human Rights
Convention. That is, the Union will not only have its own legally enforceable
human rights catalog, but will also be subject to the same independent external
rights review as its member states.
In sum, in the course of the past 50 years, the European Community has
evolved from a regional organization unconcerned with human rights or the
regimes of new member states, and featuring no more than a symbolic parlia-
mentary representation, into a liberal democratic multilevel polity. In this polity,
composed of democratic states, policies are co-decided by a bicameral legislature
of which both chambers are democratically accountable and constrained by
human rights norms and human rights review. This substantial institutional
democratization requires explanation.
The puzzle of EU democratization
A natural place to look for an explanation of EU democratization is the literature on
state democratization. Because the processes of centralization, legalization, and the
expansion of its policy scope have increasingly added state-like authority to the EU,
and the EU has adopted many liberal democratic institutions of the state, it seems
plausible to assume that the EU has been influenced by the same factors and forces
that have contributed to the democratization of the state in the past.
Traditionally, the study of democratization has been divided between the study of
structural prerequisites of democracy (in the tradition of modernization theory;
cf. Lipset, 1959) and the study of transitions focusing on strategic decision-making
(cf. O’Donnell et al., 1986; Przeworski, 1992). Two major recent contributions to
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the theory of democratization, Carles Boix’s Democracy and Redistribution (2003)
and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s Economic Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy (2006), seek to overcome this divide by combining the analysis of elite-
mass interactions with the structural conditions that constrain them. They are
therefore a useful starting point.
In their perspective, democracies are understood as regimes in which the entire
(adult) population takes part in the political allocation of economic assets.
Democratization is the shift to a regime in which taxation and distribution follow
the preferences of the majority rather than that of small, affluent elites. Whether
or not it occurs depends on the preferences and resources of both elites and masses
or citizens. Elites will more likely consent to democracy if the redistributive
impact is low or if they lack the repressive capabilities to quell revolts. Citizens are
more likely to revolt successfully if they have strong organizational capacity and
experience high economic deprivation. Elites weigh the costs of redistribution
against the costs of repression, and masses weigh the benefits of redistribution
against the costs of revolt.
According to Boix, ‘democracy prevails when either economic equality or
capital mobility are high’ (2003: 3). Economic equality reduces the redistributive
pressure on the elites, and capital mobility allows them to move their assets
abroad if taxes become too high. As Acemoglu and Robinson point out, however,
too much equality will in turn reduce the pressure of the lower classes for change
so that a medium range of inequality is most conducive to democratization (2006:
37). Under these conditions, actual democratization will be precipitated by a
revolutionary threat created by social unrest, political mobilization of the lower
classes, and/or the weakening of the elites, for example, as a result of interstate
conflict (Boix, 2003: 13; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 27).
How plausible is this account of democratization in the case of the EU? In
general, the elite- or supply-side conditions of democratization are favorable.
First, the EU has not only some of the highest standards of living in the world but
also Europe is the region with the world’s lowest inequality.3 Second, capital
mobility is high – not only within the EU but also beyond the EU borders, thus
dampening the potential redistributive consequences of EU democratization.
Third, the repressive capacities of the EU are extremely weak or, more precisely,
extremely decentralized. Control over the means of force, the military, and the
police rest firmly with the states. Not only would the member states have to
overcome the collective action problems of repressing an anti-EU revolt but also,
as liberal democratic states, they are institutionally constrained in the use of force
against their citizens. In sum, with low costs of redistribution and high costs of
3 According to the IMF, the EU’s GDP (PPP) per capita in 2007 was above US $28,000. The Gini
index for the EU is approximately at 30 (out of 100 indicating perfect inequality) (see data at http://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/qualityoflife/eurlife/index.php?template53&radioindic5158&idDomain53,
retrieved 6 March 2010).
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repression, elites would have neither the motivation nor the means to suppress
strong societal demand for EU democratization.
By contrast, the demand-side conditions are unfavorable. First, the compara-
tively high wealth and low inequality of the region does not create significant
social pressure. Because all member states are democratic welfare states, the
objectives of democratization were already realized at this level of the EU system
in the past. Second, even if European integration produced losers and higher
inequality, grievances would need to be directed at the national governments
rather than the EU. The most relevant decisions on taxation and redistribution are
made at the national level. The EU has no power over direct taxation and the most
important systems of social insurance (public welfare, health, and pensions) are
regulated and administered almost exclusively by the member states.
Accordingly, social protest directed at the EU has remained weak so far.
Research by Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow shows that the politics of protest in
Europe is predominantly domestic. Only 5% of protest activities in the period
from 1984 to 1997 addressed EU policy (Imig, 2002: 921). Even though protest
against the EU has increased in the 1990s, conflict over European policies is most
often ‘domesticated’; rather than protesting against the EU directly, nationally
organized groups turn to their national governments for support (Imig and
Tarrow, 2001: 3, 17–18). Finally, protest against EU policy is mostly accompanied
by calls for national protection rather than positive integration (Imig, 2002: 928).
The weakness, domestication, and anti-integrationist orientation of EU-related
protest politics points to deeper structural problems of EU democratization. These
problems can be summarized under the ‘no demos’ thesis, which stipulates that
the EU cannot democratize because there is no European demos. For a demos to
exist, individuals must identify themselves and each other as members of a single
political community. In addition, the demos needs to be capable of effective
political action, that is, to deliberate on politically relevant issues in the public
sphere as well as organize and mobilize political interests. These requirements are
only weakly developed at the EU level.
Democracy entails majority governments and decisions as well as redistribu-
tion. These are easier to accept for the losers if they belong and feel attached to the
same community as the majority and the beneficiaries of redistribution. Moreover,
the collective action problems of mass mobilization for democratization (Marks,
1992: 58) are more easily overcome if collective identity is strong. Yet national
(or subnational) identities and allegiances clearly predominate in the EU. Less
than 15% of the EU population identify themselves exclusively or primarily as
Europeans, whereas around 40% have an exclusive national identity (Fligstein,
2008: 141–142). Moreover, identification with Europe is a class issue. In contrast
to national identity, European identity does not unite social classes but is pri-
marily an attribute of the highly educated and well-to-do (Fligstein, 2008: 156).
This pattern of national identification has proved extraordinarily stable in the past
few decades despite strong growth in institutional integration – and is likely to
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remain so given that crucial resources and institutions of nation-building remain
under the control or within the borders of the nation-state: mass media, educa-
tion, and language (Cederman, 2001: 158–159).
‘Democratic politics is in the vernacular’. (Kymlicka, 1999: 121) A common
language is not only a fundamentally important building block of shared identity
but also a prerequisite for democratic deliberation and mobilization among citi-
zens. Correspondingly, the development of a single European public sphere is
severely limited by the extreme linguistic diversity of the EU and is not regarded as
a realistic scenario in EU research. But, even the Europeanization, that is, mutual
responsiveness, of national public spheres is limited to quality newspapers rather
than the audiovisual media used by most citizens and ‘to relatively confined issues
and time spans’ (De Vreese, 2007: 11).
Finally, the demos is not only constituted by a shared collective identity and a
common public sphere but also by political structures through which the political
preferences resulting from democratic deliberation are mobilized, aggregated, and
represented in the political system. Political associations, movement organiza-
tions, parties, and their coalitions are such structures. In the analysis of Stefano
Bartolini, the democratization of the European states ‘was a process of internal
voice structuring in externally consolidated and relatively closed territorial
systems, whose military, economic, and cultural boundaries had already tended
to stabilize’ (2005: 89). The differentiation and closure of boundaries and the
reduction of exit options for individuals in the emerging European state system
triggered the need to articulate grievances vis-a`-vis the state and to build political
structures for doing so effectively. By contrast, European integration consists in
the selective removal of internal boundaries (primarily economic and legal) and
the openness of external boundaries (as demonstrated by the successive enlarge-
ment of the EU and the flexible integration of non-member countries). This
boundary removal and de-differentiation undermines political structuring at the
EU level.
As a result, the politicization that is taking place in the EU is resulting in the
restructuring of domestic politics rather than political structuring at the European
level. First, European integration has contributed to giving new prominence to the
non-economic, cultural dimension of the political space dividing the traditionalist
and nationalist proponents of cultural demarcation from those of cultural inte-
gration (Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006). Second, the increased salience of
European integration has mostly benefited populist parties of the right that could
exploit cultural Euro-skepticism (Kriesi et al., 2006: 929; Hooghe and Marks,
2009: 15–18). Third, the new cleavages and related party contests and protest
activities manifest themselves predominantly at the national level (Imig, 2002;
Kriesi et al., 2006: 922).
In sum, then, theories that explain democratization as the outcome of redis-
tributive conflict and social revolts do not capture the conditions and mechanisms
of democratization in the EU. To the extent that European integration is the
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source of social grievances and political conflict, these conflicts take place in the
domestic political systems of the member states and the claimants typically
demand more national autonomy rather than more EU democracy. Mainstream
theories of state democratization are ill-equipped to explain EU democratization
because they assume a centralized state with a mature demos. They are not
attuned to the multilevel and multinational realities of the EU, in which the
relevant regimes of taxation and redistribution as well as the thick collective
identity, public sphere, and political structuring that make up the demos are
located at the national rather than the European level. How there can be demo-
cratization at the European level in the absence of these conditions is beyond their
explanatory scope.
One answer to this puzzle is to deny that what is happening in the EU is or ever
could be (real) democratization. Giandomenico Majone, for instance, sees the
‘incomplete development, at the EU level, of the practices and institutions of
representative democracy’ as a ‘necessary consequence of the preference of a large
majority of European voters and, more fundamentally, of the non-existence of a
European demos, not to say, a European nation’ (2005: 23–24). In his view,
democratic standards are inappropriate for ‘an inherently non-majoritarian’ and
regulatory organization such as the EU in the first place (Majone, 1998: 7; 2005:
37–39). While recognizing that there has been ‘institutional democratization’,
Bartolini regards it as just ‘fac¸ade electioneering’ (2005: xv).
This is not the place to discuss the quality of EU democracy, but these assessments
beg several fundamental questions. If it is true that the EU is a non-majoritarian and
regulatory organization without a demos, how can we then explain that it has
undergone a process of democratization in the past 50 years? And even if democracy
at the EU level has its deficits, as Bartolini claims, how could institutional demo-
cratization have occurred at all in the absence of political structuring?
The normative origins of democracy in the EU
The discussion in the previous section suggests that in order to understand and
explain democratization beyond the nation-state, a ‘gradualist’ approach will not
suffice. I therefore propose a ‘transformationalist’ approach to democratization that
is in tune with the realities of democracy beyond the nation-state. In particular, this
requires theorizing a causal mechanism that explains democratization in the absence
of a European demos (European identity, public sphere, and political structuring)
and significant powers of taxation, redistribution, and coercion at the supranational
level. Whereas in nation-state democratization, ‘[a]lmost all of the crucial democ-
racy-promoting causal mechanisms involve popular contention y as correlates,
causes, and effects’ (Tilly, 2007: 78), this is not the case in EU democratization.
I propose a causal mechanism that involves elite (rather than popular) contention
concerning constitutional (rather than redistributive) rights and competences in a
context of common transnational values and norms (rather than national identities).
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It reflects the attempts of weak or disempowered institutional actors (rather than
social groups) to increase their power.
A new transformation of democracy
According to Robert Dahl (1989, 1994, 1999), democracy was transformed
once in the past and may undergo another major transformation in the present.
The first transformation was the one from the classical assembly democracy of
the Greek (and early modern) city-state to the representative democracy of the
modern territorial state, whereas the current transformation affects the modern
state under the impact of globalization and international organization.4 The main
driving force of transformations of democracy is a qualitative increase in the size
of the polity, which results in turn from the attempt to preserve its autonomy and
efficiency. Whereas the modern territorial state was militarily (Tilly, 1985) and
economically (Spruyt, 1996) superior to the city-state, international organizations
are capable of regulating economic, environmental, and other social interactions
that transcend state boundaries.
The efficiency-driven expansion of the size of the polity, however, involves
two main trade-offs for democracy, one regarding citizen participation and
influence (Dahl, 1994: 27–31; 1999: 21–22), and the other regarding identity and
public spirit (Zu¨rn, 1998: 237–240; see also Dahl, 1994: 32; Hurrelmann and
DeBardeleben, 2009). Whereas effectiveness requires increasingly large polities,
both participation and identity are maximized in small polities. As a general rule,
the larger the polity becomes, the more delegation of power it requires to function
efficiently; the longer the chains of delegation between the citizens and their
representatives and agents become; and the more indirectly and infrequently
citizens participate in political decisions. Finally, the citizens’ collective identity and
sense of community thin out.
At the very least, these processes develop on different time scales (Zu¨rn, 1992).
Whereas the denationalization of social interactions occurs first and fastest, it
takes time to establish effective political organizations to regulate these interac-
tions; and it takes even longer for identity and political structuring to build in the
new polity. But, even in the long run, participation and identity do not recover
their previous levels. In the territorial state, citizen participation has never reached
the close involvement of all citizens in everyday decision-making that existed
in the Greek polis. Instead, direct democracy has been transformed into repre-
sentative democracy. Likewise, the tangible, local community of the city-state
with its direct interactions and face-to-face communication between citizens has
been transformed into the intangible, ‘imagined community’ of the nation-state,
in which ‘the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them’ (Anderson, 1991: 6).
4 Dahl counts differently but his first transformation (from oligarchy and despotism to classical
democracy) was a transformation to, rather than a transformation of democracy.
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In the EU polity, the thinning of identity and the weakness of citizen partici-
pation reach a new quality (see Table 1). This polity is a ‘community of com-
munities’ (Etzioni, 2007) rather than a community of individuals, and it privileges
the representation of collectivities over the representation of individuals. First,
as shown above, a ‘thick’, group-based, quasi-national identity has failed to form
in the EU and remains firmly entrenched at the national level. By contrast,
the identity of the EU is ‘thin’, civic, based on values and norms, and consists in a
commitment to liberal democracy. This is evident from the Treaty on European
Union, which stipulates in Article 6.3 that the ‘Union shall respect the national
identities of its Member States’ and in Article 6.1 that the ‘Union is founded on
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member
States’. In other words, the EU is a liberal democratic civic community of national
communities. Where cultural similarity is not available anymore across the
EU’s societies, liberal values, and democratic institutions (in addition to wealth)
generate transnational trust (Delhey, 2007).
Second, the EU is a ‘mixed’ (Majone, 2005: 46–49) or ‘compound polity’
(Fabbrini, 2007). It is not a polity of citizens possessing popular sovereignty and
direct links of election and accountability to their representatives and government
but predominantly a polity of corporate bodies, a ‘union of states and their citi-
zens’ (Fabbrini, 2007: 3). EU citizenship is derived from citizenship in one of the
member states. Only the EP is directly elected by citizens – but the EP is neither
the exclusive legislator nor does it form a government for the EU. The political
system of the EU is characterized by both the vertical separation of power
between the supranational and the national levels and by pronounced horizontal
checks and balances between political organizations at the supranational level.
These structural conditions of a compound polity embedded in a liberal trans-
national community also shape the process of EU democratization.
Conditions and mechanisms of democratization in the EU
The main actors in EU democratization are the institutional actors of the
European multilevel system: member state governments, their organizations such
as the Council, the supranational organizations (European Commission, EP, and
Table 1. Transformations of democracy
Local democracy Nation-state democracy Supranational democracy
Space City-state Territorial state Regional organization





More indirectly by citizen and
community representatives
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the European Court of Justice (ECJ)) and also national parliaments and courts.
These institutional actors are most likely to compensate the ‘demos deficit’ of the
EU; they possess the organizational capacities for bringing about political change;
the elites representing these institutional actors are more multilingual and better
equipped to participate in a transnational public sphere; and they identify
themselves less exclusively with the nation-state than the average citizen.
These institutional actors are in permanent conflict about the allocation of
political rights and competences (rather than economic assets) and about the
constitutional principles of the emerging Euro-polity (cf. Farrell and He´ritier,
2007). First, there is conflict about which countries are entitled to be in the EU
and enjoy the rights of membership. Second, there is conflict about the distribu-
tion of competencies between organizations at the same level: the Council, the
Commission, the Parliament, and the Court. Third, there is conflict between
institutional actors situated at different levels of the multilevel system, for
example, between national parliaments, courts, and governments, on the one
hand, and the EP, the Court, and the Commission, on the other.
These conflicts between organizations about the allocation of political rights
and competences take place within a liberal community. Regardless of their
conflicting positions on Europe’s informal constitution, all institutional actors
share the core values and norms of liberal democracy and accept them as fun-
damental standards of political legitimacy. The interplay of constitutional conflict
between institutional actors, on the one hand, and the consensus on liberal
democratic norms, on the other, is at the core of the causal mechanism of
democratization in the EU.
In line with liberal intergovernmentalist integration theory (Moravcsik, 1998),
the EU’s original design as a purely intergovernmental, efficiency-oriented orga-
nization can be set as the stylized starting point for the causal story. At the start,
competences in the European Communities were allocated in order to ensure the
dominance of member state governments. Governments were the only institu-
tional actors with decision-making power (constrained by the agenda-setting
power of the Commission but not by either Parliament or judicial human rights
review). They also retained the exclusive competence to modify the distribution of
competences by way of treaty revision. In addition, however, the Community was
designed to prevent member state defection from collectively beneficial inter-
governmental bargains. To enhance efficiency, the states accorded the Commis-
sion and the Court extensive monitoring and sanctioning competences. What then
triggered democratization, a process bound to reduce the power of governments
and intergovernmental efficiency?
According to liberal intergovernmentalism, member state governments are
willing to accept further integration when it is an efficient way to deal with new or
increased international interdependence. However, efficiency-driven integration
may at the same time redistribute competences among institutional actors in the
EU polity. As a general rule, further integration empowers supranational actors
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vis-a`-vis national actors. It also strengthens governments and executives vis-a`-vis
other actors at the national level (Moravcsik, 1994). In addition, efficiency-driven
integration may contradict the constitutional preferences of some EU actors.
Under both conditions, the negatively affected actors have an incentive to block or
modify integration.
Actors with strong formal or bargaining power (most often the member state
governments) can decide the constitutional changes they prefer and veto those
they dislike. Weaker actors, however, need to resort to alternative strategies.5 At
this point, the EU’s liberal democratic values and norms come into play. If weak
actors can plausibly claim that efficiency-driven integration violates the shared
liberal democratic values and norms, they can engage in rhetorical action to
prevent or retrieve losses from integration or to attain their constitutional goals
(Schimmelfennig, 2001: 62–76; Rittberger, 2005: 59–64). For this purpose, weak
actors engage in framing, blaming, and shaming. First, they seek to frame inte-
gration as a norms-and-identity issue rather than (just) an issue of efficiency.
Second, they draw attention to the fact that the planned efficiency-driven inte-
gration violates the fundamental liberal democratic values and norms of the
community. In other words, they scandalize the democratic deficit created by
integration and blame the powerful actors for being responsible.
The shamed actors can, in principle, respond in three ways: ignore the oppo-
nents and go ahead as planned, call off efficiency-driven integration, and make
institutional concessions to improve the democratic legitimacy of integration. In
general, we can assume that they prefer to reap efficiency gains without com-
promising their legitimacy and that of European integration. This means that they
can only go ahead as planned if the opponents’ claim of a democratic deficit is
unfounded. Generally, efficiency-driven intergovernmental integration does not
create a formal democratic deficit as long as all participating governments are
democratically elected, decide unanimously, and remain accountable to national
parliamentary scrutiny and judicial human rights review. Accordingly, Berthold
Rittberger (2006) has shown that federalist demands for supranational democracy
failed in the early integration period because none of these principles were vio-
lated. If one of these principles is undermined, however, the proponents of further
integration will, if possible, rather consent to incremental democratization than
foregoing substantial efficiency gains of integration. The result is an incremental
democratization of the EU that follows or accompanies the growth of efficiency-
oriented integration.
To summarize, EU democratization results from constitutional conflict among
institutional actors about the distribution of political rights and competences in
the liberal EU community. This happens under two main conditions: (i) efficiency-
driven integration generates a democratic deficit and (ii) negatively affected but
5 Please note that this is not an argument about strong and weak member states. All states have
formal veto power and are thus considered strong actors in constitutional politics.
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weak institutional actors are able to refer to the EU’s liberal democratic values
and norms to undermine the legitimacy of efficiency-driven integration and to
strengthen their position in the constitutional conflict. Because the shared liberal
democratic norms of the transnational European community are the crucial
condition for democratization, I speak of the normative origins of democracy in
the EU.
Case studies
In the remainder of the paper, I will briefly illustrate how this mechanism worked
at critical junctures for the three major areas of EU democratization described
at the beginning: democratic membership conditionality, parliamentary decision-
making rights, and human rights. Each case represents the historical episode
during which the core democratic reforms in these three areas were first intro-
duced. The Spanish application for association to the EU established the norm of
democratic membership; the introduction of the cooperation procedure in the
Single European Act (SEA) first accorded the EP real legislative power; and the
adoption of human rights standards in the jurisdiction of the ECJ introduced
human rights to the EU level.6 The liberal democratic rights and competences first
established during these episodes were subsequently further institutionalized and
elaborated.7 But, later developments mainly followed the normative precedents
set at these critical junctures.
The case studies follow a process tracing rather than a comparative design. In
each of them, I seek to demonstrate the core elements of the democratization
mechanism theoretically outlined above: how efficiency-oriented steps of further
integration triggered constitutional conflict among the EU polity’s institutional
actors and how formally weak institutional actors were successful in bringing
about democratization steps by invoking the EU’s liberal democratic standard of
legitimacy. Table 2 gives an overview of the cases.
Democratic membership
In the Treaties of Rome, no explicit conditions were attached to applications for
membership in the European Communities – except for being a ‘European state’.
Soon after the Treaties came into effect, the new organization was faced with
several requests for membership and association (with a membership perspective).
6 For the case studies, I draw on a collaborative project with Berthold Rittberger (Rittberger and
Schimmelfennig, 2006). For the case study on membership conditionality, I rely on Thomas (2006). For
the case study on legislative rights, I draw on Rittberger (2005). Finally, the case study on human rights is
based on Schimmelfennig (2006).
7 Stacey and Rittberger (2003) as well as Farrell and He´ritier (2007) analyze such interstitial insti-
tutional changes in the EU. Farrell and He´ritier explain them as renegotiations of incomplete contracts in
which bargaining power rather than rhetorical power mattered.
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In the initial debates of how the EC should respond to these requests, the
democratic credentials of the candidates did not play a significant role.
When fascist Spain showed interest in closer ties with the EC, this was generally
welcomed by the member states. The French and the German governments as well
as the Commission regarded Spain as a valuable addition to the emerging com-
mon market and encouraged Spain to open negotiations on association and,
eventually, membership. Thus, the push toward further integration was driven
predominantly by efficiency reasons.
These developments provoked the resistance of the Parliamentary Assembly – a
weak actor because, at the time, it did not have any formal say over association
and accession. However, it appointed Willi Birkelbach, a German social democrat
and victim of the Nazi regime, to draft a report on the association process. For
him and his fellow parliamentarians, European integration was not primarily
about market efficiency but about the consolidation of peace and democracy in
post-war Europe. According to Thomas, ‘if they wanted to shape Europe’s future,
Birkelbach and his EPA colleagues would have to provoke a political crisis and
frame the resulting debate with norms that the governments of the Member States
would be reluctant to disavow, regardless of their preferences on the issue at hand’
(2006: 1197–1198).
The Birkelbach Report referred to the common values of the member states as
well as the admission criteria of the Council of Europe (rule of law, human rights,
and fundamental freedoms) to assert that states ‘whose governments do not have
democratic legitimacy and whose peoples do not participate in the decisions of
the government, neither directly nor indirectly by freely elected representatives,
Table 2. Three critical junctures of democratization in the EU
Membership Legislation Human rights















Member states Member states ECJ
Weak/disempowered
opponents


















rights into EU law
EU5European Union; EP5European Parliament; ECJ5European Court of Justice.
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cannot expect to be admitted in the circle of peoples who form the European
Communities’. (Birkelbach, 1962, cited in Thomas, 2006: 1198) The arguments
of the report were taken up by the press, socialist parties, and trade unions in
order to mobilize against the association treaty with Spain.
Faced with increasing normative pressure by the Parliamentary Assembly and in
the public, the member state governments generally became more cautious on the
issue of Spanish association, and the Benelux countries retreated from their earlier
support. In the course of 1962, the member state governments first delayed their
decision and then shelved association with Spain. Finally, they signed a simple
tariffs agreement in the framework of the GATT. It was not before Spain’s
transition to democracy in the 1970s that the question of association and mem-
bership was taken up again. Spain joined in 1986.
The case shows how an efficiency-oriented move toward further integration
with a country that violated generally accepted standards of political legitimacy in
the community triggered successful rhetorical action by actors without formal
powers or strong bargaining power. Whereas the association and accession of
democratic countries like Britain or Switzerland could legitimately be regarded in
an efficiency perspective, the Spanish case could be used by those actors with an
interest in a democratic European Community to scandalize the narrow efficiency
orientation of many member state governments and to introduce democratic
membership conditionality. Although it took until the Maastricht Treaty in 1992
to put this conditionality into treaty language, it was generally recognized after
the Spanish episode that non-democratic states could not join.
Legislative powers of the EP
Until the SEA of 1986, the EP did not have any legislative competences apart from
being consulted on legislative proposals made by the Commission. The SEA then
introduced the cooperation procedure in which the Council decides with qualified
majority in the first reading, and the EP can amend or reject the Council’s deci-
sion. If the EP rejects the proposal, the Council can only uphold it with unanimity.
If the EP amends the proposal, the Council is obliged to take the amendments into
account insofar as they are taken over by the Commission. For the first time, the
SEA thus accorded the EP formal legislative power. How did the cooperation
procedure come about?
Throughout the 1980s, federalist governments and parliamentarians had
demanded more legislative rights for the EP, but as long as the Council decided
with unanimity, the formal chain of democratic accountability remained intact.
All democratically elected member state governments could veto legal acts and
ensure that none of the constitutive demoi of the Community was overridden. All
Council decisions formally benefited from full indirect democratic legitimacy.
When the member states launched the Internal Market Program, however, they
also committed themselves to qualified majority voting (QMV). QMV was seen as
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necessary to increase the speed of EC decision-making and to overcome opposi-
tion to market-enhancing regulation by individual member states. The rationale
for moving from unanimity to QMV was thus efficiency-based. At the same time,
however, QMV implied the possibility of overruling individual demoi and their
national governments and parliaments. The chain of democratic accountability
was thus broken and indirect democratic legitimacy suffered.
This democracy deficit was criticized by members of parliament in national
parliaments as well as in the EP who demanded that the loss of indirect demo-
cratic legitimacy needed to be compensated by expanding the legislative compe-
tences of an organization invested with direct democratic legitimacy: the EP
(Rittberger, 2005: 150–152). Although most member state governments were not
sincerely committed to increasing the powers of the EP and realized that this
would undermine both legislative efficiency and their own powers (Rittberger,
2005: 163, 165), they acquiesced to the demands of parliamentarians. By con-
trast, some member states like Denmark and the United Kingdom opposed
empowering the EP. Because their domestic audiences were critical toward
supranational integration, they were not under pressure to grant more legislative
powers to the EP. Rather, they stressed the need to preserve efficiency.
This case shows how an efficiency-based claim for the deepening of European
integration undermined democratic accountability and (indirect) democratic legiti-
macy and triggered demands by national and European parliamentarians for com-
pensatory democratization at the EU level. Democratic accountability (including the
parliamentary accountability of governments) is a shared norm in the community. As
a result, even the governments that were most skeptical of the strengthening of
supranational organizations consented to extending the EP’s powers in the end.
Yet the establishment of the Cooperation Procedure is not as clear a case of
effective rhetorical action as the establishment of democratic membership con-
ditionality. First, even though ‘non-ratification was never a real threat’ (Rittberger,
2005: 167), national parliaments could have rejected the SEA in principle unless
their demands for EP empowerment were accommodated. They were thus not as
institutionally weak as the Parliamentary Assembly in the case of Spanish asso-
ciation. Second, the Cooperation Procedure was a compromise solution designed
to meet the British efficiency concerns (Rittberger, 2005: 169). The British consent
thus did not result from normative pressure. Finally, the strongest provision of the
Cooperation Procedure – that the Council needed unanimity to overrule the EP’s
rejection of a legislative proposal – was the outcome of a last-minute veto threat
of the Italian government (Rittberger, 2005: 169). In sum, whereas the govern-
ments’ weakening of democratic accountability for reasons of market-making
efficiency triggered rhetorical action by the less powerful institutional actors – the
national and Euro-parliamentarians – the eventual introduction of EP legislative
powers was partly the result of efficiency-based compromises and veto threats.
In the Treaty of Maastricht, the Codecision Procedure, which extended the
legislative powers of the EP, replaced the Cooperation Procedure in most cases.
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But, the norm that QMV in the Council must be complemented by an empowerment
of the EP has remained a fundamental principle of institutional reform in the EU.
Human rights
The initial steps of institutionalizing human rights in the Community were taken
by the ECJ in its case law from the late 1960s onward. It was only in the preamble
of the SEA of 1986 that human rights featured in an intergovernmental treaty of
the Community for the first time and in a purely declaratory manner.
In its two landmark decisions Van Gend en Loos (1963) and Costa (1964), the
ECJ claimed the direct effect and supremacy of EC law. According to the ECJ, the
EC would not be able to attain its central goal of creating a common market
otherwise. The claim for supremacy was thus clearly based on efficiency. Natu-
rally, supremacy referred not only to EC law but also to the ECJ. In all matters
pertaining to EC law, the ECJ would come out at the top of the European mul-
tilevel court system. The ECJ’s efficiency-oriented move thus created institutional
losers from integration, above all the highest national courts.
At the same time, the supremacy claim created a legitimacy deficit. Supremacy
applied not only to ordinary domestic law but also to national constitutional law
and the individual rights and freedoms protected under it. National constitutional
review was effectively suspended for issues regulated by EC law. At the same time,
there was no EC system of human rights protection. As a result, direct effect and
supremacy threatened to reduce the level of human rights protection in the
Community. This legitimacy gap could be used by national courts to challenge the
supremacy claim.
The most explicit challenge came with the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
case, which had its roots in a referral to the ECJ by a German administrative
court, which claimed that EC provisions were ‘contrary to certain structural
principles of national constitutional law that must be protected within the fra-
mework of community law, with the result that the primacy of supranational law
must yield before the principles of the German Basic Law’.8 In its decision of 17
December 1970, the Court conceded that such community measures needed to be
subject to constitutional human rights review in principle (thus paying tribute to
the community’s standard of legitimacy). However, it rejected the argument for
national constitutional review.
In fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles
of law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, while
inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the member states, must be
ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the community.9
8 ECJ, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fu¨r Getreide- und Futtermittel,
Case 11/70.
9 Ibid.
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This was an attempt by the ECJ to silence national courts by showing that it
used their standards of human rights protection and that there was no legitimacy
deficit that would justify challenging the supremacy of the ECJ. The German
administrative court, however, did not accept this preliminary ruling and referred
the case to the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). In the meantime, the
ECJ added another ‘source of inspiration’ to its human rights jurisdiction in its
Nold decision (1974), in which it included international treaties such as the
European Convention of Human Rights to the guidelines it would follow in its
legal practice.10 The general strategy of the ECJ was to argue that all human
rights otherwise observed by the member states and enforced by national and
international systems of human rights protection would also be protected in the
EC legal system.
For the time being, however, the FCC did not accept this conclusion. Two weeks
after Nold, it issued its ruling on the referral of the Internationale Handelsge-
sellschaft case. Although it found no violation of German constitutional rights in this
particular case, it used the occasion to make the general statement that, ‘as long as
the integration process has not progressed so far that Community law also contains
an explicit catalog of fundamental rights, passed by a Parliament, valid and
equivalent to the catalog of fundamental rights of the Basic Law’, national courts
would have the right and, indeed, the obligation to refer the case to the FCC
for constitutional review if they deemed the preliminary ruling of the ECJ to collide
with fundamental rights as protected by the Basic Law.11 The FCC rejected the
supremacy of EC law as a general principle and limited the direct effect of EC law to
those provisions that did not encroach upon essential elements of constitutional
structure – in particular the Basic Law’s catalog of fundamental rights.
This decision gave the supranational institutionalization of human rights
further impetus. First, the ECJ made increasingly detailed use of the European
Convention to imbue its case law with legitimacy. However, the Court could not
do anything on its own to meet the other thresholds of legitimacy claimed by the
FCC in 1974. For that, it required the assistance of other Community actors. In
1977, the EP, the Council, and the Commission published a joint declaration
‘concerning the protection of fundamental rights’, in which they repeated the
ECJ’s assertions on the respect of the Community’s legal system for fundamental
human rights as found in the constitutions of the member states and the European
Convention. In their 1978 ‘Declaration on Democracy’, the heads of state and
government aligned themselves with the interinstitutional declaration. In the
preamble to the SEA, the member states then proclaimed their determination ‘to
work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights
recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European
10 ECJ, Nold vs. Commission, Case 4/73.
11 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Solange I, BVerfGE 37, 271, author’s translation.
228 FRANK SCH IMMELFENN IG
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773910000068
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:32:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
Social Charter, notably freedom, equality, and social justice’.12 The transfer of
case law to treaty law via political declarations added further legitimacy to the
ECJ’s rulings.
As a result, in its Solange II decision of October 1986, the FCC ruled that ‘as
long as the European Communities, in particular the jurisdiction of the Court of
Justice of the Communities, generally guarantee an effective protection of fun-
damental rights y which is equivalent in principle to the protection of funda-
mental rights required as indispensable by the Basic Law y the Federal
Constitutional Court will cease to exercise its jurisdiction on the applicability of
secondary Community lawy and to review the compatibility of this law with the
fundamental rights of the Basic Law’.13
This case shows that the introduction of human rights to the EC resulted from
the competition of two courts located at different levels of the European multi-
level system. The ECJ’s efficiency-based claim for supremacy was challenged by
the FCC on the grounds that human rights protection in the EC was inadequate.
This challenge drew on the shared norm that political decisions and laws must be
constrained by human rights and subject to human rights review. In order to
uphold its claim for supremacy of EC law and the efficiency of market integration,
the ECJ therefore had to include the respect for human rights into Community
law and human rights review into its own practice.
It is a peculiarity of this case that none of the main opponents was formally
more powerful than the other. There is no established hierarchy between the
European and the national legal orders. The result was a double rhetorical
entrapment. On the one hand, the ECJ needed to introduce human rights review
at the European level to strengthen its claim of supremacy. On the other hand, the
FCC felt compelled to accept this claim provisionally after the ECJ had complied
with the standard of legitimacy.
The three critical junctures in the EU’s history of institutional democratization
share several commonalities. In all cases, efficiency-oriented moves toward further
European market integration challenged democratic norms. Moreover, institutional
actors that did not have the formal or bargaining power to block these moves
invoked the shared liberal democratic norms of the community and prompted the
integration-Friendly actors to introduce democratic rules and institutions at the EU
level. In sum, the cases conform to the assumption that democratization in the
EU takes place as a result of constitutional conflict between institutional actors in
the context of a transnational community of liberal democratic values and norms.
These commonalities have brought about democratization against the back-
ground of otherwise distinct conditions at each critical juncture: different liberal
democratic norms, different constellations of actors, and different configurations
of formal power between the opponents and the proponents.
12 Official Journal L 169, 29 June 1987.
13 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Solange II, BVerfGE 73, 339, author’s translation.
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Conclusions
In the EU, institutional democratization has taken place under conditions and in
ways that standard theories of nation-state democratization with their focus on
popular contention and economic redistribution are unable to capture. I have
therefore proposed a transformationalist analysis that takes into account the specific
conditions of the EU multilevel system. The fact that the EU is composed of
democratic welfare states has a triple effect on democratization at the supranational
level. First, the powers of coercion, taxation, and redistribution remain under the
primary control of, and subject to democratic accountability in, the member states.
This makes the traditional reasons for democratization obsolete and explains why
theories of state democratization do not fit. Second, however, the efficiency-oriented
reallocation of political competences from the national to the supranational level
and in favor of executives and agencies tends to devaluate traditional democratic
institutions and processes. This creates new demand for democratization – especially
by those institutional actors that have a weak position in the European multilevel
system or lose competences as a result of European integration. Finally, liberal
democracy is the shared standard of legitimate authority in the EU system and thus
provides a powerful normative resource for the proponents of supranational
democratization. In an international organization originally designed to maximize
intergovernmental efficiency, the shared norms of liberal democracy could be used
rhetorically by weak institutional actors to increase their negotiating power in
constitutional conflicts, to constrain the more powerful actors, and to attain their
constitutional goals. In this sense, the origins of democracy in the EU have been
normative rather than economic or social.
I illustrated the transformationalist theory of democratization empirically
in three cases that were arguably the most important critical junctures for
establishing the core liberal democratic norms of membership, parliamentary
legislation, and human rights review in the EU. As other studies have shown, the
further elaboration and institutionalization of these norms have involved different
negotiating mechanisms than rhetorical action (see, e.g., Hix, 2002; Farrell and
He´ritier, 2007). But they confirm the transformationalist view that democratiza-
tion in the EU is a process of constitutional conflict between institutional actors.
Future research should seek to establish to what extent this theory of demo-
cratization is relevant beyond the EU. For one, the EU experience could be
compared with democracies that developed in initially decentralized multilevel
systems such as the United States or Switzerland. Another axis of comparison
could be other regional organizations. Possibly, however, such comparisons would
rather show the particularities of EU democratization than the generalizability of
the transformationalist approach proposed here. Regarding other regional orga-
nizations, for instance, it presupposes the rare case of a supranational organiza-
tion of exclusively democratic states. Without supranational integration, there is
no need to compensate the loss of democratic autonomy and competences at the
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national level by democratizing the supranational level. Without democratic
membership, there is no shared standard of democratic legitimacy that would put
normative pressure on powerful (state) actors in favor of democratization.
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